## Exhibit A

K9M3FTCC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, et al., 4 Plaintiffs, New York, N.Y. 5 20 CV 706 (DLC) v. 6 VYERA PHARMACEUTICALS, LLC, et 7 al., Defendants. 8 9 ----x Teleconference 10 September 22, 2020 4:00 p.m. 11 Before: 12 HON. DENISE COTE, 13 District Judge 14 15 **APPEARANCES** 16 17 MARKUS H. MEIER Attorney for Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission 18 JEREMY KASHA 19 Assistant Attorney General for Plaintiff State of New York 20 21 MICHAEL BATTAGLIA Assistant Attorney General for Plaintiff State of 22 California 23 RICHARD S. SCHULTZ Assistant Attorney General for Plaintiff State of Illinois 24 25

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7	SARAH OXENHAM ALLEN Assistant Attorney General for Plaintiff Commonwealth of Virginia
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10	MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP Attorneys for Defendants Phoenixus AG and Vyera
11	Pharmaceuticals LLC BY: STEVEN REED
12	DUANE MORRIS LLP
13	Attorneys for Defendant Martin Shkreli BY: CHRISTOPHER CASEY
14	KANG HAGGERTY AND FETBROYT LLC Attorneys for Defendant Martin Shkreli BY: EDWARD KANG
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16 17	KANDIS KOVALSKY
18	KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP Attorneys for Defendant Kevin Mulleady BY: KENNETH DAVID NICHOLAS RENDINO
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1	THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. This is Judge
2	Cote speaking. I'll briefly take appearances.
3	For the FTC?
4	MR. MEIER: Good afternoon, your Honor. Markus Meier
5	on behalf of the FTC.
6	THE COURT: And for the State of New York?
7	MR. KASHA: Good afternoon, your Honor. Jeremy Kasha
8	on behalf of the State of New York.
9	THE COURT: For California?
10	MR. BATTAGLIA: Good afternoon, your Honor. Michael
11	Battaglia on behalf of the State of California.
12	THE COURT: For Illinois?
13	MR. SCHULTZ: Good afternoon. Richard Schultz on
14	behalf of the State of Illinois.
15	THE COURT: For North Carolina?
16	MR. STURGIS: Kip Sturgis for North Carolina.
17	THE COURT: For Ohio?
18	MS. MAAG: Good afternoon. This is Elizabeth Maag on
19	behalf of the State of Ohio.
20	THE COURT: For Virginia?
21	MS. OXENHAM ALLEN: Hi, your Honor. This is Sarah
22	Oxenham Allen for the Commonwealth of Virginia.
23	THE COURT: Is there any other counsel representing a
24	plaintiff?
25	MR. BETSKO: Joseph Betsko from the Commonwealth of

1 Pennsylvania.

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THE COURT: Would you spell your last name for the reporter.

MR. BETSKO: B-E-T-S-K-O.

THE COURT: Thank you so much. And for the defendants. Mr. Reed, is it Phoenixus?

MR. REED: Yes, it is. Steve Reed on behalf of the two corporate defendants, Phoenixus and Vyera.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. And for Mr. Shkreli?

MR. CASEY: Good afternoon. Chris Casey from the Duane Morris law firm on behalf of Mr. Shkreli. I also have colleagues from the Kang Haggerty firm on the phone as well.

MS. KOVALSKY: This is Kandis Kovalsky and I'm here with Edward Kang as well.

THE COURT: Thank you so much. And is there anyone else representing Mr. Shkreli who wishes to put their appearance on the record? Fine.

Mr. Mulleady?

MR. DAVID: This is Kenneth David from Kasowitz Benson Torres, and on the phone is my colleague Nicholas Rendino.

THE COURT: Thank you so much, counsel, and thank you for making yourselves available on such short notice. I feel we've made some progress, though it might not feel like that to you. I know it's been a lot of correspondence in the last two weeks or so.

Let me deal first with the sealing issues. Thank you so much for identifying with brief statements why you believe certain materials should be redacted or filed under seal.

That's of enormous assistance to me so that I can either consider and accept or consider and reject your reason. So you've simplified my work, and I thank you for that.

There is one more thing that I'd ask you to do if you could. And that is, when you're filing your redacted letter or other document on ECF, and providing me with an unredacted version, please highlight if you could the redacted passages so it's easy for me to find those without having to compare the two documents, the unredacted with the filed redacted copy. And the FTC has been doing that, but I'd ask counsel from Duane Morris, please, if you could also make an effort to highlight the passages that you've redacted in the publicly filed document. Thank you so much.

MR. CASEY: Yes, your Honor. This is Chris Casey. We apologize for that, and we'll certainly do that going forward.

THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate it.

So let's get to the substance of the issue. As counsel have acknowledged in your letters to me, I have not ruled that any of the material in the FTC's or plaintiff's possession that it received from the Bureau of Prisons pursuant to a subpoena is in fact privileged. And I cited today in an order of course the Second Circuit decision that counsel are

familiar with indicating that this material is not privileged.

Nonetheless, I exercised my discretion to hold back the plaintiffs from reviewing all of the material captured pursuant to that subpoena served on the Bureau of Prisons. And it has been of great assistance to me to review the document that defendant Shkreli filed, I believe it is a September 14 document filed under seal that lists in that document eight different categories of attorneys or groups of counsel for which at that time identified matters on which those different individuals and groups of lawyers were working.

As a result of that disclosure, the FTC on September 17 revised its request and focused on two categories: I, which lists Ms. Kovalsky, and the Kang Haggerty firm, with respect to many different items of representation. I think there are 23 listed in all. And then in the third category, there is a representation by an attorney Scott Vernick as part of the Fox Rothschild law firm's representation of Mr. Shkreli, and in connection with that disclosure, there are 10 different matters listed.

In its September 17 letter, FTC is explaining why it believes these two categories are the two categories of documents it wishes to see, and the defendant has responded on September 18.

So, I don't have a resolution here, and therefore, I wanted to talk with counsel. But here is my view, generally:

None of this is privileged, and therefore, the FTC has the right under the law to look at all of this. We're now down to looking at two of the eight groups of materials, and it seems to me that the burden should not be on the FTC to spend more time trying to identify, you know, reasons for looking at material it has a total right to review. So the burden is on Mr. Shkreli if he feels there is any particular reason to hold back the material captured within category I or category III, and I want to give him an opportunity to make that showing to me.

It's not going to be based on a privilege argument. This material is not privileged. And it seems to me we're down to generally talking about relevance and generally talking about advice or communications that concern, in one way or another, the events described in the complaint in this case. And if there is material that is not connected to the events described in the complaint, then I'm willing to consider a showing by the defendant that that material should not be reviewed by the FTC.

I have another concern here, and that is that we've already spent several weeks -- and I know the parties have spent several months -- talking about these issues. And I think any showing has to be made to me fairly quickly, and I don't know what volume of material is involved here, but with respect to the first category, it seems that communications

span several years and the volume could be high, and the task of trying to pull out what the defendant believes should not be reviewed by the FTC could be a very burdensome task.

So with those observations, Mr. Casey, do you want to be heard?

MR. CASEY: Yes, your Honor. Thank you, if I may. Your Honor, I would like, if the Court would permit me, to just take a step back and to talk about the practicalities of representing an inmate like Mr. Shkreli who is in federal prison and the hurdles we've encountered. And the reason I raise that, your Honor, is not to bypass the issues you've raised, which I think we agree on the issues on the table. But if we decide, if the Court decides that there are certain matters that are certainly not relevant, our position on that would be that they should not be in discovery, and there shouldn't be any reason for the plaintiffs to have access to those. That's the first part.

But the second part is for those items in discovery, the communications that you have already said are not connected, or are connected to the events in this case, it's those communications that we are the most concerned about because we effectively do not have representation of Mr. Shkreli in the way that representing a client outside of prison would have.

As all of the people on the call have at least on our

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side have experienced this. You have essentially unlimited access to your client. In this case, your Honor, there are three modes of communicating with Mr. Shkreli that are unmonitored by the BOP, all of them are impractical. If I may go through those for just a minute. I don't want to take a lot of time.

You can do a prison visit. Well, since COVID-19 has started, they stopped prison visits. So we've had no visits with Mr. Shkreli. In fact, I've not met Mr. Shkreli. Prior to COVID, there was a norovirus outbreak at Allenwood, which stopped visits going back to January. That is just out. can't do that. Second is unmonitored phone calls. calls that counsel can arrange with the prison in advance, they're done on a very infrequent basis, and usually, always you have to have a good reason for the call. And they're limited in time. I've had 15-minute calls with him, I've had 30-minute calls, and you have a list of things you race through and then you're done. You're done for a couple of weeks, frankly, so it is just not effectively. The third is legal mail. The old fashioned U.S. Postal Service mail. I think everyone would agree, in a fast-paced litigation, that is simply impractical.

What happens is inmates communicate with their attorneys on TRULINCS. The attorneys try to limit the extent they are revealing confidences and confidential subjects on the

call. But as a practical matter, under Rule 1.4 of the model rules of professional responsibility, we are obliged to get our client's consent on matters that are pending. So, we feel a heavy obligation to communicate with him.

So these are the obstacles we're up against, as is every other counsel representing inmates in these prisons. And that's why, since the *Mejia* case in 2011, there has been a widespread outcry to change the BOP system. In fact, there is a bill that's passed the Congress that will do just that. It will make all these attorney-client communications privileged.

I respect the Court's ruling on that. I am not going to go back to it. But I think it is important to understand what practically is going on here. Because, particularly with the COVID-19 pandemic, we effectively don't have access to Mr. Shkreli as we would normally. So I think that's a very important consideration for the Court. Because if we get to a place where -- and I want to be practical about this -- where we've narrowed it down to just those communications that are connected to the events in this case, the plans and defenses, those are the very communications that are protected by the privilege. It is effectively eroded because of the reasons I mentioned. I wanted to make that statement at the outset. And I appreciate the Court's indulgence on that.

But I do agree that relevance is a key issue here.

And we have tried to push back, if you will, on plaintiffs on

the relevance issue from the very beginning of this dispute way back in June. When we saw in the production 20,700 communications that Mr. Shkreli has made from prison, not only with his attorney, but with his family and friends and e-mails of a personal nature, that clearly to us didn't seem relevant and didn't belong in the case.

We've tried to engage with the plaintiffs on that for a long time, and I agree we have made progress. I do appreciate the Court's assistance in that regard.

But I would say this: The plaintiffs have conceded that there are various matters that other attorneys, other than Ms. Kovalsky and Mr. Vernick, have worked on that are simply not relevant to this case, and I agree with that of course. I also think similarly they should agree and concede that many of the matters on which Kang Haggerty was engaged with Mr. Shkreli are simply not relevant, and I'm happy to provide more detail on that.

I would say generally, your Honor, items 1 and 2 of category I would be the category that may potentially have relevant communications. And just another point the Court should understand. We, the Duane Morris firm and Kang Haggerty got involved in late December of 2019. Prior to that time, he had no awareness that he was even a subject of this investigation. And we frankly scrambled to get together a presentation to the commission in January. And then the

complaint was filed in late January.

The communications they're asking for go to

February 12. That's the communications they've asked for to

date. Those are the very communications about when we were

just getting engaged in the case. I would venture to guess,

your Honor, there are e-mail communications in that production

that would relate to the matters, that relate to the client and

defense, so we're concerned about the disclosure of those.

We're also concerned about ongoing sort of realtime disclosures to our adversary, as I think you can appreciate.

But just getting back to that. The first two matters are ones we would say may potentially have relevant communications, but I would say it would be limited in the sense that some of it is not relevant. But then if you go to number 3 through 15, and then 18 to 23, all of those are irrelevant and do not deal with matters that would be connected to the events in this case.

I just pause for just a minute on item 16 and 17. These are the items they've asked for in their letter. 16 is direction and preparation of trust agreement for Mr. Shkreli. On that item, plaintiffs have asked for communications relating to that because they believed or had a theory that Mr. Shkreli may have been setting up a trust to hide assets to prevent the plaintiffs from getting access to his assets. They made that representation in the letter to the Court. As we explain in

our reply letter, that's not the case at all. It was a voting trust agreement that he was negotiating with Vyera on. It had nothing to do with this case. So those communications would not be relevant.

Number 17, providing legal advice and shareholder rights to Mr. Shkreli. Again in our letter we explained that a dispute arose regarding indemnification of fees. There was some discussion about Mr. Powers' role in that, and that's where that advice came in. I would say some of that may be relevant. I don't know, frankly. But, this is just the kind of advice that lawyers perform all the time for clients.

It is not, as plaintiffs have claimed, business advice. Ms. Kovalsky is a lawyer. She's not a business advisor. She advises on the law. And that argument that they made I think was rebutted effectively and shouldn't be considered any longer to the Court.

If they're after business communications as to

Mr. Vernick's communications, I will be candid with the Court

and tell the Court that I'm not as familiar with Mr. Vernick's

representation of Mr. Shkreli. I'm happy to get more

information about that. But looking at some of the matters,

just looking at the case caption, it appears that many of those

are just litigations that have nothing to do with this case.

I'd also say, your Honor, there are a number of attorneys here, Mr. Brafman's law firm and others, that have

matters that the plaintiffs have said they are not interested in. Some of those overlap with the matters listed in item 1. So, they waived that. They can't go back now and try to get Ms. Kovalsky's communications relating to those matters that they say they are not interested in.

So that's our position on the relevance, your Honor. I don't think they've made their case that they are entitled. And in terms of the *Mejia* case, we understand that the Court has ruled on that. I would just say that the case was in 2011, there have been developments in this, again, getting back to the practicality of this, in this area that has made that case difficult to apply, particularly in the face of the pandemic. I'd ask the Court to consider that.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Casey, I'm quite familiar with the difficulties that the pandemic has posed to incarcerated defendants. It is a big part of my docket, as it is as every federal judge's docket. And of course, the FTC is not seeking the communications from your law firm who is representing the defendant in this lawsuit. And if we had a carve-out from March 2020 forward, of course, that would take into account the impact of the pandemic on the prison system and prisoners in the system.

There may be other issues with respect to the individual facility in which the defendant was incarcerated in the period before March of this year. But, the pandemic issue

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and the impact that it's had on the ability of inmates to communicate effectively with counsel is really cabined in time.

So, before I hear from counsel for the FTC, Mr. Casey, I don't know what the volume is of the communications with Ms. Kovalsky and Mr. Vernick in were in categories I and III on the chart. Do you have any idea?

MR. CASEY: The volume, your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. CASEY: I do not, your Honor. I can check on that and get back to the Court, unless one of my colleagues from Kang Haggerty is more familiar with that.

> THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from --

MR. CASEY: Your Honor, if I may, just I apologize for interrupting but just briefly. You mentioned that they are not seeking e-mails from the Duane Morris law firm. In fact there are no such e-mails. We have not been on the TRULINCS system. I can tell you it's difficult to get on the system, and we've been trying. But, I just wanted to make that point for the record. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. You are listed as category 7. is the law firm.

MR. CASEY: There should be a note that we have not had any communications to date. If you look at footnote 11, your Honor, page 7.

> THE COURT: Yes. Okay.

MR. CASEY: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let me give the FTC a chance to respond.

MR. MEIER: Thank you, your Honor. Markus Meier on

behalf of the FTC.

I'd like to start just by setting just a little bit of context and then I'll get right to the heart of the issue. As your Honor has heard from the defendant throughout this litigation, the FTC did a multiyear pre-complaint investigation, and the vast, vast majority of the Bureau of Prisons materials that we collected were collected pre-complaint, before we ever even filed the complaint.

So with respect to Mr. Casey's hardship argument, I think, frankly, and I hesitate to say this, but I think they are a little bit of a red herring, and here's why. The FTC committed at the outset of these issues with Mr. Casey, and we did this in writing, we did it numerous times, that we would not seek any Bureau of Prisons materials going forward, and that was in recognition of COVID issues. But all of the materials we collected are pre-March 2020, thus pre-COVID.

And I note, and it was interesting, despite all of the back and forth we've had to date, Mr. Shkreli's counsel have not made any showing of any type of particularized hardship in the pre-COVID period of communicating with his lawyers, and in fact, Mr. Casey's on record right now saying that the Duane Morris firm apparently hasn't been prohibited from having

confidential communications since the pre-COVID period. So that's a starting point for us.

But, let me talk a little bit about the relevance issue. Because Mr. Casey has spent a lot of time talking to us about that, and he's raised it in some of the briefing before your Honor. Again, the issue for us was the FTC conducted a pre-complaint investigation, and of course, government investigations aren't governed by the federal rules of evidence or federal rules of civil procedure and the scope is broader. In FTC cases it is determined by the commission's process resolution that attaches to all subpoenas that are sent, investigative subpoenas and investigative demands. So, and that makes sense because at that point we're trying to figure out whether the law's been violated, if so, which laws, and if so, who was involved. And if so, what to do about it.

But even under the federal rules of civil procedure, discovery is broader than this narrow concept of relevance that I've heard Mr. Casey make reference to numerous times in our conversations, and I think that's what he's talking about with your Honor, too. A sort of a relevance standard that we wouldn't expect to have discussions about until we get to the point where we're preparing exhibit lists and making excerpts of depositions and the kinds of things that are done pretrial, but of course discovery is broader than that.

And moreover, as your Honor is very familiar, parties

and third parties often produce materials in response to discovery requests that aren't "relevant" in some narrow evidentiary sense. It happens all the time. And we'll deal with the relevance issues — in our view we should deal with the relevance issues at the relevant time, which is pretrial.

What we have shown, your Honor, and what we believe to be the case, is that there are communications in those materials that clearly talk about business matters, and some of them do involve communications with attorneys. And we've specifically limited ourselves at this point to those involving Ms. Kovalsky and Mr. Vernick.

I understand Mr. Casey is not that familiar with some of the materials with Mr. Vernick, but just to give a little bit of background about him. He was a lawyer that was originally hired by Mr. Shkreli for business matters. He later became effectively Vyera's corporate counsel, essentially their general counsel, the outside lawyer before the corporate entities got a general counsel. He was involved in Vyera's business decision—making activity, including much of the conduct that was alleged in the complaint. And that's why we're looking for materials from him. Ms. Kovalsky, as best we can tell, has also been involved in business discussions and decisions. And sometimes, we know from e-mails that we have seen that we have been able to look at, that Mr. Shkreli sometimes uses lawyers as conduits and as a connection back to

the non-prison world, to have discussions about business matters and to continue to have discussions on his behalf, sort of his messengers, if you will, or go-betweens on business issues.

So, I think within the spirit of what the federal rules of civil procedure require for this conduct that's relevant in discovery, that there are likely to be many relevant documents within those materials. What ultimately becomes relevant for purposes of trial might be something much narrower. It always is. But at this point we don't think we should be hamstrung by the defendant's choices as to what is and isn't relevant to us.

That's all I have to say, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Meier, do you have a sense of the volume of material in categories I and III of the communications with Ms. Kovalsky and Mr. Vernick?

MR. MEIER: Your Honor, I do not. But I do, I know a couple of my colleagues are on the line who did not make a notice of appearance, and one in particular, I can call on him right now and see if he happens to know that because he is very close to these issues, if your Honor would like.

THE COURT: Certainly.

MR. MEIER: Okay. Neil Perlman.

Mr. Perlman, do you happen to know roughly what the volume of those materials are?

MR. PERLMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is

Neil Perlman. We don't have an exact count, because as your

Honor knows, we've redacted a number of these materials in

response to the August 20 order. But, I believe these

redactions span a large number of files across I believe 28

different sets of e-mail exchanges. And each one of those

documents does not just contain one e-mail, but instead it

contains a large number of chains. So while we aren't able to

give you an exact number, we know it is a large volume, and

moreover, we don't really have an ability to sort of segregate

by subject matter or the topic of representation by the

counsel. They're all in one document, as it were.

THE COURT: So you can sort -- if I understand this correctly -- by recipient or sender, so you're able to identify those communications that would be between Mr. Shkreli and Ms. Kovalsky and Mr. Vernick. Am I right?

MR. PERLMAN: Your Honor, we're able to figure out which e-mails were between Mr. Shkreli and Ms. Kovalsky or Mr. Shkreli and Mr. Vernick. We aren't able to sort in the way that one often thinks of in terms of using metadata, because these documents were produced to us by the Bureau of Prisons in PDF form. So we have to manually search each one of them for the relevant recipients or senders.

THE COURT: Thank you. So, I know counsel are busy working on a variety of issues concerning this litigation. But

I'm going to ask you, Mr. Meier and Mr. Casey, to have one more conversation today or tomorrow, if possible. What I'm envisioning is an agreement that would allow the FTC to review the materials captured by items I and III, unless the defendant was able to identify a particular reason that that review should not take place, and the timetable to permit the defendants an opportunity to identify specific communications that would fall within that category.

So, it's not a privilege log, and of course I don't want to mislead anyone by suggesting that I'm using the term "relevance" in a way that would be the 401 standard under the federal rules of evidence. And I need a discussion from you about timetable. And if you're not able to reach an agreement on the method that would give Mr. Shkreli one last opportunity to sort of hold back particular items from categories I and III, which it believes are either totally irrelevant from his point of view and/or prejudicial for FTC to review, and I'll just have to think about this further myself, and decide whether wholesale review of those categories of documents should go forward.

Obviously you can talk about a date cutoff. It sounds like there isn't anything captured in these categories from the COVID era. But it sounds like there won't be any difficulty in agreeing that there should be a cutoff date so that COVID-era communications are off limits.

Before we end this conversation, Mr. Casey, did you have any comment or question?

MR. CASEY: Well, just, your Honor, briefly on that note on the COVID issue. Some of these communications are from January and February up to March 12. When you use that term COVID era, do you have a sense of any particular date, because I know there are communications that predate March 12.

THE COURT: I don't have at my fingertips the date in which the Bureau of Prisons essentially shut down operations.

I believe it was in March, but that date is knowable.

MR. CASEY: Okay. Thank you for that. Your Honor, the other thing I was going to mention as a potential way to cut through this, plaintiffs have offered, or the plaintiffs have said in their letters that what they're really interested in is items 16 and 17. And those are items that we would be willing to provide those documents to them. As said, and I don't think they are relevant, but if they want them, I think we're willing to let them have them. And as I said before, I do think that with the exception of numbers 1 and 2, all of the others are simply not relevant. That's just something that I would propose as a compromise.

THE COURT: I appreciate you thinking along those lines, and I'll let you discuss that with the FTC.

Mr. Meier, is there any comment or question you had before we end this call?

MR. MEIER: Yes, your Honor. Thank you. I was trying to write down your Honor's general instructions. And one statement your Honor made caught my attention, because I could see how this could become a difficulty when we have these discussions with Mr. Casey and his colleagues.

Your Honor talked about something being totally irrelevant or prejudicial, and did your Honor mean unfairly prejudicial as opposed to simply prejudicial? Because clearly, anything in those documents that might be useful to the FTC will be prejudicial to Mr. Shkreli. But I am assuming the Court meant unfairly prejudicial in the rule of evidence sense, and not just merely prejudicial.

THE COURT: Yes. Not probative of liability but something so personal or confidential that it is unrelated to this case. Really, I don't think the distinction is unfair prejudice, because things that can be unfairly prejudicial for a jury would be highly relevant in terms of the discovery process. So I think we're not talking in that category at all. But certainly anything that involves Mr. Shkreli's health or family issues or personal issues unrelated to his business, I don't think the FTC is asking to see any of that or needs to see any of that. So I'll let counsel have further discussions and hope to hear from you tomorrow or the next day at the latest, and hope that you are able to find a way forward here. Thank you so much.

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MR. CASEY: Thank you, your Honor.
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                MR. MEIER: Thank you, your Honor.
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                (Adjourned)
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